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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BENJAMIN B. ALWARD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
R. E. GREEN, doing business as 




·NATURE- OF THE CASE 
.. The appellant, Benjamin B .. Alward, who resides at 148 
First-· Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, ;her~inafter- designated 
as t~e plaintiff, brought this action to recover -f!om the respq~­
dent, R. E. Green, doing business as Nat~onal_ School.Assem-
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blies, hereinafter designated as the defendant, the sum of 
Nine Thousand ( $9,000.00) Dollars, plus interest and costs, 
by rea"son of an alleged breach of contract which had existed 
between them. 
The defendant is a non-resident natural person living in 
Los Angeles, California. In order to secure jurisdiction of his 
person the plaintiff served summons upon one of the defend-
ant's alleged agents in conformance with then existing Sections 
104-5-11(10) and 104-3-26.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
which provided the procedure for securing jurisdiction of non-
resident persons doing business within the state of Utah. 
Plaintiff first served one of defendant's alleged agents 
with summons in case No. 857;6 in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County on March 31, 1949. Defendant there-
after appeared specially and moved the court to quash service 
of summons on the ground that the defendant was not subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Utah court within the purview of 
the aforementioned sections of our law. After a complete 
hearing the court, Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, .over-
ruled defendant's motion to quash service of summons, signed 
findi~gs of fact and conclusions of law and ordered defendant 
to appear and plead in the action. 
Soon thereafter the defendant succeeded in re-opening 
the matter upon discovery that the time and place of service 
was not endorsed upon the copy of the summons given de-
fendant's agent and successfully persuaded the court to reverse 
its position. The motion to quash was then granted defendant. 
This was done upon the strength of the case of T hornas v. 
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District Court--of .Third Jttdicial District in and for ·Salt Lake 
County. 110 Ut~ 2.45, 171 P. 2d 667. 
Plaintiff then made a second service upon another alleged 
agent at a later date, but voluntarily dismissed the entire action 
lt pon learning that another technicaiity would bar him inas-
much as summons hadn't ttissued,, (been placed in the hands 
of a proper person for purposes of service--former Section 
104-5-5; now Rule 4 (a) and (b), lJtah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure) within the three-month period allowable. 
Thereupon a new complaint was filed and a new action 
was commenced in the same court, No. 88052 (the case at 
bar) , and plainti...ff proceeded to make proper service on yet 
another of defendant's alleged agents. This third service was 
made on January 16, 1950. 
Once again the defendant appeared specially to quash 
the service on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the· person 
of the defendant in accordance with Rules 4 (e) ( 1 0) and 17 
(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure--which had by then re-
placed Sections 104-5-11.10 and 104-3-26.10. After a hearing 
on the matter the court, Hon. Albert H. Ellett presiding, de-
cided in favor of the defendant, thus creating two contrary 
rulings on basically the satne set of facts. 
On December 29, 1950 (R. 25) the court signed an Order 
quashing the service of summons, in substance as follows: 
_ cc • • • IT IS 1-IEREBY ORDERED that the service 
of summons upon the defendant . in this action be, 
and is, quashed, annulled and set aside for lack of 
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.'' 
5·· 
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It was from the foregoing Order that the plaintiff pe-
titioned the Supreme Court of the State of. Utah for an Order 
granting an intermediate appeal, and on February 19, 1951 
this court granted an appeal. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
The facts of the case as brought out on the hearings 
and which defendant will undoubtedly agree to be so except 
insofar as they involve any commitment by him jeopardizing 
his position in a -trial on the merits of the case are as follows: 
The defendant operates an organization which supplies 
artists and attractions for the purpose of giving performances, 
primarily to schools, throughout the western United States. 
These programs are presented by talent furnished by the 
defendant under the terms of contracts which he makes with 
the various schools. In order to fulfill these contracts the de-
fendant enters into contracts of a different nature with a 
group of approximately twenty or more artists, of which the 
plaintiff was one, to give such performances as and when 
scheduled. 
The plaintiff and the defendant signed a contract (R. 3-4) 
on February 10, 1947, whereby plaintiff was to give perform-
ances to school assembly programs on· rr Australia," consisting 
of a lecture illustrated with colored motion pictures, as directed. 
The contract was to expire on June 1, 1950, at the end of the 
school year 1949-50. The plaintiff was booked to perform 
in many schools in several states, including ctnearly every school 
in Utah." (Ex. C.) 
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.Plaintiff _had_ fulfilled a regular ·"'eek's perfo_r~ances as 
scheduled on a Friday afternoon in the latter part of January, 
1949, the year of the ubig winter." He \Vas in eastern Orego~ 
at the time and was proceeding to travel eastward via Soda 
~ prings, Idaho> in order to r\:~lch the state of South Dakota. 
The distance involved necessitated continuous travel in order 
that he be in South Dakota in tin1e to give scheduled perform-
ances the following 1\1onday morning. He traveled by auto-
mobile. 
At Burley, Idaho, he was advised (Exh. A-A, p. 9) that 
roads to the east \vere snowbound and that he should travel east-
ward via Ogden (Weber canyon). However, upon reaching 
Snowville, Utah, he encountered a blizzard which continued 
southward at least as far as Salt Lake City. Due to the weather 
conditions he did not attempt to travel through Weber canyon 
but came into Salt Lake City, \\rhere he became snowbound for 
some twelve to fourteen days. 
While in Salt Lake City the plaintiff corresponded with 
defendant. As a result of this correspondence and because of 
his not reaching South Dakota plaintiff received a letter from 
the defendant whereby the .latter cancelled the remainder of 
the plaintiff's tour of the midwest for the year and terminated 
plaintiff's contract (Exh. A). The plaintiff thereupon com-
menced the action now before the court. 
STATEMENT· OF POINTS 
Plaintiff-appellant submits the following points as reasons 
for seeking reversal of the ·lower court's ruling: 
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' 
( 1) The court erred in holding that the defendant, by and 
through R. W .. Dill, the agent upon whom service of summons 
was made, was not doing business at the school where the 
service of summons was made, within the contemplation of 
Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
( 2) The court erred in holding that the school at which 
defendant's agent was served was not a place of business within 
the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e) ; 
( 3) The court erred in holding that the cause of action 
did not arise out of the conduct of business done in the State 
of Utah, within the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e). 
ARGUMENT 
(I) 
The court erred in holding that the defendant, by and 
through R. W. Dill, the agent upon whom service of summons 
was . made, was not doing business at the school where the 
service of summons was made, within the contemplation of 
Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Cit'il Procedure. 
This appeal will center around the interpretation to be 
given to Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
had just been adopted at the time of the service of summons 
involved. This rule was substantially identical with former 
Section 104-3-26.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 ( 1947) Laws: 
Rule 17 (e) Action Against a Non-resident doing 
Business in this State. 
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When a .non-resident person is associated· i_q. and con-
ducts bl!Siness within the State of lJtah in one. or more 
places in his ovlli name or- a common trade name, and 
said business is conducted under the supervision of 
a manager. superintendent, or agent, said person may 
b~ sued li1 his oY. n H,lcle in any action arising out of -
the conduct of said business. 
The manner of service of process in such cases is prescribed 
by Rule 4 (e) ( 10) : 
Rule 4( e) ( 10) Personal service in this State. 
Upon a natural person, non-resident of the State of 
Utah, doing business in this State at one or more places 
of business, as set forth in Rule 17 (e) , by delivering 
a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to one 
of his managers, superintendents or agents. 
Inasmuch as no findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were prepared in support of the court's order, nor need they 
be prepared in view of Rule 52 (a), lJtah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which states n • • • ·Findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 
12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b)," 
reference will be made to the court's memorandum decision 
at the close of the hearing, which forn'led the basis for the 
order quashing service of sun1mons (Rec. 52-56, inc.) 
The defendant is a non-resident natural person conducting 
business in the State of Utah under the common trade name 
of National School Asemblies. This the defendant admits 
(R. 10, 11), but he maintains that the orily business done in 
Utah by him is through his booking agents who call at schools 
throughout the state in the fall of ~ach year f~r t~e purpose 
9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of booking engagements with the schools- as agenis for the 
artists (such as plaintiff). Throughout this brief we shall 
carefully point out that in actual practice it is the artists who 
are the agents for the defendant and not the defendant who 
is the agent for the artists as maintained by him. 
In its memorandum decision the court (R. 53, 54) indi-
cated that Jackson Junior High School in Salt Lake City, was 
not a place of business of the defendant nor was the agent do-
ing business at that place. The ruling is not entirely clear, 
but, if so, the most that can be said is that part of it is im-
material. The discussion follows: 
THE COURT: I will rule that he did not maintain a 
place out of which he did business, but I will rule that he did 
do business in more than one place. 
MR. IVERSON: Will Your Honor rule on this point, that 
the service upon him at a school was a place of business within 
the contemplation of this statute so that we can have that 
taken care of ? 
THE COURT: I will rule that he was served in Salt Lake 
·City, a place where he had done business. 
MR. IVERSON: Well, will Your Honor rule this, that 
the service upon him at the school was a proper service because 
it was a place of business? 
THE COURT: I will rule that it was not a place of busi-
ness of the defendant. 
· MR. IVERSON: That it was not a place of business of 
· the defendant within the contemplation of that section? 
10 
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THE COURT·: _Well, :1 am going· -to leave -that·.question 
to the Supreme Court as_ to \vhether it has to. be a place of 
business of the defendant. 
MR. IVERSON: Of course, if Your I-Ionor rules on that, 
'':e will have something to present to the Supreme Court. 
THE COURT: I will hold that he was served at Salt Lake 
City, a place where he had done business, but that he was not 
doing business within the contemplation of this statute in 
(Jackson Junior High), the place where the service was n1ade. 
(Further Discussion) 
Let us examine the foregoing in the light of Rule 17 (e) . 
As can be seen, the Court in its first statement above indicated 
that it would hold the defendant « « • • • did do business in more 
than one place." Then, in the last foregoing sentence, says, 
«« ••• he was not doing business within the contemplation of 
this statute in ... the place where service was made." 
It can readily be seen that the defendant could not be do-
ing business at Jackson Junior High School while being a non-
resident except- through one of his agents. Let U:s examifi'e 
what occurred at that school on January 16, 1950, the date of 
servtce. 
R. W. Dill, the person served, and his brother wer-e giving 
an assembly program to the student body at Jackson J~nior 
High School. They v1ete replacing another program· (Nevin 
Magicians) which the defendant's booking agents had pre-
viously booked for that date, but which was replaced for some 
reason. f ... t any rate, the. schooL was obligated to accept the 
11 
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1 bill Bi-others by reaso11 .of the defendant's contract with the 
' school which provided: . . '· 
_cc_ ... If .an a~traction booked herein cannot perform 
·' . as scheduled, ap.o-the'r attraction of equal quality will 
· :- be acc;epte~ by_the spo~ors.n (Recp~d 1_8) .. 
' · Of course, defendant· will and has maintained that these 
- .. .l. -. --. • 
·contracts are those .of t~e artists inasmuch ·as· he_. merely: runs 
an c,cemployme,nt agen~y" ~nd· th~t he' is' the agent and the ~rtist 
is the'principal. Howeyer, the facts clear1y show that the de-
fendant operates ~-.large~ <?rganizat~?·n,- having ~booked Hnearly 
evety school in the. stat~ of Utah" '(Ex. C). It---is inter~sting 
to note that defendant has told his talent:" cc_If we did not do 
~ ' .J 
a terrific volume of busin~ss -~~'"~auld not be in business ,today 
-·" (E h T) ~ . -
• • • X • • 
· Defendant .cannQ~ successfully maintain that the Dill 
·:Brothers were-per~5>rmjng an-d f~lfillirig 'their:own~contratt with 
the schools in view of _his own 'very carefully· worded affidavit 
-in ·support-of .his. motion to· quash ·service of·summons wherein 
he acknowledges (R." 1_1) __ that the- bookings solicited by his 
agents ... rr beconz~ a~ binding contract upon the defendant." . 
· The contracts are tl!o~~ of the defendant alone! 
. - ·, --?~~·-. _ ..;.. 
c '- That being the ca~e th~ only conclusion that can be reached 
-is- that the Dill Br9tpers w~re performing ·a -legally binding 
obligation o£ .the defend~,f2t. Further; Mr. Dill's own testitnony 
(R. 3'8) indicates that th~ir. story "fo the ·school at.· the com· 
.. mencement of a pxogram. was: c '\X' e .. ~re the Dill Brothers, Ro' 
- .. . I. 
· · and Bob, -and we·.hay~· ~~en sent by' National School Assem· 
- olies:" At the end of the program ~they would . say~ ((We 
. 12 
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. are ·very _happy .to :P~fforqt before you and~_.yery happy. that 
National School Assernblies has n1ade __ i~ possible : fo~ .1:1~. ~o 
come your way." These staten1ents were made according to 
instructions given to all talent ( Exh. G-iten1s 54 and 55). 
If the fulfilling of a contract isn't ndoing business" what 
is ? The artists 'vere consumating the very essence of the 
subject-matter of the contract. Furthern1ore, upon con1pleting 
their performance they collected the amount due under the 
contract, kept their share and remitted the balance to the de-
fendant at the end of the week. Receiving one's pay for a job 
well done is the final act of n doing business." In fact, their 
contract 'vith the defendant (R. 14 ( 6)) requires such col-
lection to be made as also do the ((Suggestions to Talent" sent 
out by the defendant (Exh. R) which provide: 
'"26. You are responsible for making collections in 
schools. In fact, that is one of the most important parts 
of your contract . . . '' . . 
Now, if the defendant still maintains that the Dill 
Brothers and other artists were merely fulfilling their OV{n con-
tracts which the defendant had secured for them as their agent 
how can he explain the fact that the Dill Brothers ·entered 
into their contract with the defendant on Sept. 9, 1949 (R. 
14), the contract to be effective not before .January 1st, 1950; 
but the contract under which they were giving a performance 
at the time of service of summo.ns was entered into on October 
20, 1948 (R. 18), nearly a year before the circuit engaged them 
and more than a y~ar b~fofe their contract beca1ne effective 
with the defendant?· (Supported by affidavits _of school prin-
cipals-R. 16-19, inc.; 21.,-23, inc.; Exh. _·G,_ Item 20). To. say 
13 
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that the defendant's booking agents made the contract as agents 
for ~ principal that was non-existent and unknown would seem 
to be stretching agency law to the limit. The simple truth is 
that the performers were in reality agents of the defendant 
despite his protestations to the contrary. The lower court has 
so held. 
Plaintiff submits that the performance of the defendant's 
contract and the collection of the money therefor, part of which 
belonged to the performer and part of which belonged to the 
defend~nt (R. 55-Court'_s Memo. Dec.) constituted ndo-
ing business'' by the agent. In fact, the events at the schools 
by the artists would seem to constitute the most active type of 
ndoing business." 
Most of the cases concerned with defining the phrase (!do-
ing business" have been those involving corporations. Black's 
Law Dictionary, Third Ed., p. 605, condenses the many cases 
on the subject, setting forth the following ingredients: 
'' . . . The doing of business is the exercise in the 
state of some of the ordinary functions for which the 
corporation was organized . . . What constitutes 'do-
ing business' depends on the facts in each particular 
case . . . The activities of the corporation, however, 
must represent a more or less continuous effort . . . 
or be of a systematic and regular nature . . . The trans-
action of a single piece of business is not enough ... " 
Here we have an organization which sends out agents 
each year to book engagements throughout the state of Utah. 
In performing under the contracts made a large group of 
artists traverse the state in waves, a new one arriving in the 
14 
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wake of the one leaving~ This continues from. 28 to· 3.2 .weeks 
each year · (Exh. C), or in all, the bulk of- the. school year. 
The activities are the culmination of the basic purpose of the 
organization, and are continuous, systematic and regular . 
.r\t this point it is well to point out that the defendant did 
not and has not now appointed an agent upon whom service 
of process could be made (R. 24 - Plaintiffs Affidavit of 
Effort to Locate Defendant) in accordance with Section 1 04· 
5-11.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 (as added by Laws of 
1947), which requires that: 
(<Every non-resident person doing business as pro-
vided in Section 104-3-26.10 (now Rule 17 (e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure) shall file or cause to be filed 
a certificate, under oath, with the Secretary of the State 
of Utah, setting forth the name and place of business 
of his manager, superintendent, or agent upon whom 
service of summons may be had and shall file said 
certificate setting forth the name of said. manager, 
superintendent, or agent on or before the 15th day 
of January in each year \-Yith the Secretary of the State 
of Utah." (Italicized portion added.) 
It is quite apparent that our legislature inserted the fore-
going provision into our la'v for the- purpose of providing a 
method whereby any Utah citizen could serve summons upon 
a non-resident doing business in this state who operated from 
no given office, such as· the defendant in this case. The unfortu- · 
nate thing, however, is that no penalties are provided for those 
who do not register. Consequently, non~residents who op-
erate in a manner similar to the defendant simply refuse to 
register. since they v1ill lose- nothing thereby (the.t;e ~ave only 
15 
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been three non~residents who have des!grtated agents with 
the Secretary of State according to the writer's inquiries) and, 
when sued, can instruct their real agents to keep away from' 
process servers. Note the amusing and interesting manner 
by which this was done (Exh M-Letter to Donas) : 
Mr. and Mrs. John Dona 
General Delivery 
New Meadows, Idaho 
Dear friends: 
3 October, 1949 
Next week you start your tour in the state of Utah. 
During the entire time that you are in the State of 
Utah your t(Power of Attorney" is not to be in effect. 
Nothing contained in our t(Suggestions to Talent,'' 
or any literature that might even tend to allow you to 
be agent of our burea,u is in effect in the State of Utah. 
If banks accept your signatures for cashing checks 
made payable to National School .A.ssemblies they must 
do so at their own risk . . . 
Please be most careful about this at all times in Utah. 
Cordially yours, 
R. E. Green, Director 
If one is so fortunate as to serve one of these agents 
they then come into court on a special appearance, as here, 
and claim that no agency relationship exists, or that they are 
not ccdoing business" or that they are not doing business at 
any place. 
Surely the legislature intended that non-resident persons 
doing business in the manner of the defendant were just the 
very ones to be included within the scope of Rule 17 (e). 
16 
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(II) 
The cottrt erred in holding that the school ttl tvhich de-
fendant' J agent U'as ser-z;.ed lL'dS not a place of business tvitbin 
the contenzplation of Sdid R1de 17 (e). 
The court, as heretofore pointed out, stated that it would 
hold that the agent \Yas served H ••• in Salt Lake City, a place 
where he had done business," and that Jackson Junior High 
School, the place where service of summons was made was 
Ct ••• not a place of business of the defendant." (R. 54). 
It should be remembered, however, that the statute (Rule 
17 (e) ) concerns itself with defendants who are doing business 
in one or more places by means of managers, superintendents 
or agents. It is not necessary that there be an established 
office out of which business is done, but only that business is 
done in one or more places. Nor does the place at which the 
business was done have to be a place of business of the de-
fendant-which carries the connotation of an office. 
If this court concludes that the agents were doing busi-
ness at Jackson Junior High School, the place where service 
was made, then it must also conclude that that school was a 
''place" within the contemplation of Rule 17 (e). Plaintiff 
submits the common judgment would say that no person can 
do any volume of business unless it is done at a place or places. 
The very fact that the statute referred to "one or more places" 
indicates that the legislature had in mind just such organiza-
tions as that of the defendant who travel sans offices-always 
working out of a briefcase. 
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Defendant may ·contend that Rule'"4. (e) (10),-previously 
referred to, makes it mandatory that -service be made upon 
an agent at sqme office or fixed place of business. In support 
of such a v_j_~w h_e would h~ve to rely _o!l the wording of the 
rule which follows: CCUpon a natural person, non-resident 
of the State of Utah, doing business in this State at one or more 
places of business . . . " (Italics add~d). Plaintiff submits, 
howe¥er, that nothing contained in the foregoing phrase can 
be so broadly construed as to give an inference that the statute 
is so limited as to require that the places of business need be 
fixed in the form of an office or some stationary headquarters. 
But, should there ·be any doubt in the court's mind as to the 
meaning of the legislature concerning the requirement of a 
fixed place of business the plaintiff again calls attention to 
Section 104-5-11.10, discussed heretofore, which requires that 
non-residents doing business in this state designate an agent 
upon whom service can be made. If Rule 17 (e) were so 
narrow as to apply only to fixed offices or other- forms of sta-
tionary head9ua~ters of conducting business there would then 
be little need for Section 104-5-11..10 since locating an agent 
would be a simple matter. 
Furthermore, Rule 4 (e) ( 10) relating to serv1ee does 
not limit or qualify Rule 17 (e), nor can it since it is entirely 
subordinate to Rule 17 (e). In fact, Rule 4 (e) ( 10) re-
fers to Rule 17 (e) -directly: ccUpon a natural person, non-
resident of the State of lJtah, doing business in this· State at 
one· or more -places of business, as set forth in Rule 17 (e), 
... " (Italics added). cThus; it. can be seen that.Rule 4 (e) (10) 
deals only with·-the :method of service and does not qualify or 
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- alter in any resl?ect the na~ure or manner of do~ng busi~ess, 
either as to place, method or· locality. 
If it be. argued that the agent served must be associated 
\vith an office or son1e similar fixed place of business it would 
be 'veil to compare the broad language of the Utah statute 
and that of a somewhat similar Iowa statute (Sec. 11,079, 
Iowa Code 1927, also 1931): 
"\Vhen a corporation, company, or individual has, 
for the transaction of any business, an office or agency 
in any country other than that in which the principal 
resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk 
employed in such office or agency, in all actions .grow-
ing out of or connected with the business of that office 
or agency.'' 
It can readily be seen that Rule 17 (e) is so written that 
its intent was to include situations like the one at issue. If 
it had intended that the rr place or places of business} as .ret forth 
in Rule 17 (e) ... " should be limited to an office or agency 
or other fixed place of business it would have been a very 
simple matter for the legislature to have qualified Rule 17 (e) 
as did the Iowa legislature. Since it did not it can only be 
presumed that it intended that the law should not be so 
narrow in its scope. 
A simple analysis of the foregoing Iowa statute shows that 
the agent must be fixed and established at a definite location. 
But the distinction between the Utah and the Iowa statutes 
becomes apparent in view of Utah's .law (104-5-11.10) re-
. quiring an agent to be designated for . purposes of service 
whereas the Iowa statute has no need for such similar accom-
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panying legislation since it specifies which agent can, be served 
within the very terms of the given statute. 
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this case come within 
the intent of the legislature in view of the wording of Rule 
17 (e) in that · s~rvi~e of summons was made upon an agent 
of the defendant doing business in one or more places. 
(III) 
The court e1'red in holding that the cause of action did 
not arise out of the conduct of business done in the State of 
Utah, within the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e). 
The lower court in its memorandum decision made a hold-
tng (R. 52) as follows: 
THE COURT: I think I ought to rule that this defendant 
had an agent in Utah but that the cauJe of action set forth does 
not arise out of the conduct-! also ought to hold that Green 
had done business in Utah but that the cause of action of Mr. 
Alward's did not arise out of the conduct of such business in 
Utah." (Italics added). 
MR. DECKER: YoucHonor, I would like to interrupt for 
.one point. That statute doesn't talk about -cause of action. It 
talks about action. (Italics addeg). 
The foregoing holding, in the opinion of the plaintiff, 
raises a ·point-which is entirely immaterial to the case inasmuch 
as the -court labored under the -·impression that the cause of 
dction must arise in Utah. But '\Vhat does Rule 17 (e) provide: 
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· tt ••• said person n1ay be sued. in his ow.n nan;te .i.n 
any action arising out of the conduct of said b'lisiness." 
(Italics added·.) · · · 
Similarly, the Iowa statute: 
tt • • • service rna y be made on any agent . . . in all 
actions growing out of or connected with the busi-
ness . . . " (Italics added). 
Now when the legislature used the word rr action" did 
it mean rr c.111Se of action"? We think not. Iowa has said that 
an ttaction," as the word in general statute of limitations, is 
a proceeding in court, and a ((cause of action" is the fact or 
facts which establish or give rise to a right action. (Dean v. 
Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank & Trust Co.} 281 NW 714, 128 
ALR 137). 
One of the leading authorities in the United States point-
ing out the sharp distinction between the vlord ((action" and 
the words ((cause of action" is a Utah case. ·It is DINSl\llORE 
et al. v. BARKER, DISTRICT JUDGE, 61 Utah 33·2, 212 
Pac. 1109. There, in pointing. out the distinction the court said: 
((The word taction' is a generic term, having a broad 
and comprehensive application, and, in the absence 
of any restrictive word ... n1eans any legal proceeding 
in a court for the enforcement of a right or for the 
purpose of obtaining such a remedy as the law allows, 
or a judicial proceeding which, if conducted to a termi-
nation, will result in a judgment . . . " 
The case of ALWARD V. GREEN is an ((action." In 
other words, the lawsuit alone is sufficient to qualify under 
our statute. It is not necessary that the cause of action (which 
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might ·technically ·arise upon mailing a --letter ·of termination 
in Los Angeles· or ·washington, D.C., ·arid therefore have its 
technical situs there) arise in this state, but only that the action 
arise out of conduct of the defendant's business i~ this state. 
As further authority pointing out the difference between 
the terms C< action" and ((cause of action:" 
tcAn 'action' is the means that the law has provided 
to put a (cause of action' into effect." 
Woods tJ. Cook, 58 Pac. 2d 965 (California) 
((An (action' is a means of redress of the legal wrong 
described by the words (cause of action'." 
Schueing v. State, 59 Southern 160. 
tcUnder the federal rules, the term (action' does not 
mean (cause of action,' which is substituted by the word 
(claim'." 
Winkelman vs. GMC, DC of NY 48 Fed. Supp. 490. 
Inasmuch as the legislature provided that the action must 
arise out of the ((conduct of said business" it provided a 
suitable standard by which a non-resident will not be submitted 
to lavisuits which arise out of business done in a state far 
-beyond the confines- of Utah, which might be the case if the 
technical situs of the cause of action is to be the place of suit. 
By the very nature of modern business conduct it is easily con-
ceivable that situations may arise where the action might arise 
out of the conduct of business done within- this state and yet 
the situs of the cau-se of action may arise in some other state. 
Thus, the defendant would contend that although the action 
may arise out of Conduct of business -done in .Utah, the technical 
situs- of the cause --of action- is· in -California and arose· upon 
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placing the letter of cancellation. in the mails. However, this 
argument is beside the point in view of the express "'yording 
of our statute. 
No better discussion of this issue can be found than is 
pointed out in the case of Caldtt'ellt'. At'mottr, 43 Atlantic 517 
( 1899), before statutes similar to the Utah statute were con-
sidered constitutional, which stated: 
((It has been suggested that we may hold the statutory 
mode of service upon non-resident citizens valid only 
in cases like the present one, where the cause of action 
accrued in this state. The legislature has not so limited 
the operation of the statute, and the courts have no 
power to do so. The statute is general and applies equal-
ly to all cases of non-residents doing business in this 
state, irrespective of the fact that the cause of action 
accrued here or elsewhere. To hold this mode of service 
upon a non-resident good where the cause of action 
accrued in this state, and bad where the cause of action 
accrued out of the state, would be wholly unwarranted 
by the statute, and would be legislation by the court, 
and not construction." 
Our court has heretofore held the statute at issue to be 
constitutional in the case of TV ein v. Crockett, 195 Pac. 2d 222 
(Utah, 1948). In that case Justice Latimer in the majority 
opinion indicated in several places that if a cause of action 
arose in Utah '.' ... witnesses will be readily available." But, 
as previously indicated, the reverse might be true, as would 
be the case if a letter canceling a contract were mailed while 
traveling on a train in say, Illinois, 1500 miles from any state 
connected with the transaction out of which the action arose. 
Actually, witnesses will be more readily available in th~ state 
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where the· .transactions· out: of which the ·aotion ·arises should 
occur. 
In contrast. to the case at bar an. entirely ·different .set of 
facts presented themselves in the W ein case. There was no 
occasion to bring out the distinction between the terms (tac-
tion" and ttcause of action" in that case. In fact, the authori-
ties cited in support of the constitutionality of a statute such 
as ours failed to note the distinction, and used the terms inter-
changeably. In those places where Justice Latimer indicated 
that the situs of the cause of action had anything to do with 
the case his statements- were purely dicta and not significant 
since there was no reason in the W ein case for making a dis-
tinction between the terms. Actually, his statements tending 
to point out the distinction were just as numerous, such as the 
following: ((By voluntarily doing business in this state, a non-
resident impliedly consents to being sued upon causes of 
action arising out of the transaction of business in this state 
. . ., " thus asserting that the cause of action need only arise 
out of business done here, not that the cause of action must 
arise here. Similar statements are found elsewhere in the 
decision. 
It appears that the fundam~ntal issue of this_ case is simply 
this: Did the action arise out of the conduct of business in 
the State of Utah within the me3:ning of Rule 17 (e) ? 
-!&e plaintiff, Mr.- Alward; subn1its that he was ~ngaged 
tn the c~n4uct of_. defendant's business . in the state of Utah 
duririg. the. 10. or -_~o: days i.t:nmediately · prec~ding the receipt 
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At the time the ·alleged <:ause of ~ction arose Mr. Alward 
~ carrie'd· with him a power of attorney (Exh. F) which reads 
as follows: 
.. .. \. \.. 
. -... \..~ '=-
.... ·~. 
.... • .... .. . ... \. _, . -~ t. 
. '" 1~ September t94s 
-J 
POWER OF ATTORNEY 
This authorizes the bearer: 
·- ~:· Mr. Benjamin B. Al~ard --~ 
· who has countersigned below, to_ serve . as business 
representative for National School Assemblies; to make 
all settlem.eQ.ts1_ and to endo,rse and cash any checks 
· made payable to Natio·na:l SchooL Assemblies. 
This authoii~tiot? ·is,. ~oo,d until June 10, ·19~9 . 
. _ ·. NATIONAL SCHOOL-ASSEMBLIES 
L 
, · · - ~- .. __ -By .( s/d) R. E. Grf~n .. ) 
. . "-
R. E. Green, -Director 
. -'- .. --
{ ·--' 
Countersigned-: ( s/ d) :_ 
BenjalJlin B. Alw-3.rd _ 
(Not_arized) 
· This . power of~ a!torney was received -u~cler cover of a 
letter '"(Exh;,.E) which reads in -part as follows: 
TO THE MANAGER OF EACH ATTRACTION 
- -
·(tHerewith i-s yo~r tcPo~~r of Attorney." -
.. This. gives you the authority. to . do business for 
_ N~tional School" Assemblies; .to sign_ ~r endorse and 
·-· cash checks made ou.t to. National School.-Assemblies, 
and otheryvise to ;ep~esen~ the . ;;organization in any busi-
ness dealing! . I' • " {Italics ·added)~. 
25 '.:· 
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,. : ,:·
4 
. Plaintiff operated according . to the· . terms ·of a contract 
(Exh. B) under which he v:as to· deliver performances in ac-
cordance with bi-weekly schedules to be delivered to him by 
Mr. Green, and under which he was otherwise.~to perform 
u as directed." He was directed in the performance of his 
duties by a list of ((Suggestions to Talent" (~xh. G) and 
periodic ''Special Bulletins to Talent" (Exh. S and T). The 
.~ ttSuggestions to Talent" begin with the following pertinent 
sentence which indicates that the defendant considered plain-
tiff's activities while in Utah as the "conduct of business:" 
"In order that the Booking Bureau and the Talent 
Attractions may better work in harmony and more 
effectively serve the schools successfully and with a 
minimQm of lost motion and friction, we offer the 
following suggestions for the conduct of business." 
(Italics added.) 
Among the points relating to ttconduct of business" as 
thereinafter specified are Schedules (items 1-4), Mail Points 
(items 5-8); Cancellations (items 9-15), J\1aking Dates As-
signed (item 16), Telegrams (items 17-18),.Publicity (items 
29-24), ·Booking·· Additional Dates (item 25 ), Collections 
(items 26-28); Change in the Hour of Assignment (items 
29-30) ~ Conduct (items 3 5-6), ·Deductions for Missed Dates 
(items 38-40), Remittances (item 56) and others.· Apparently 
Mr ~ Green; the defendant, ·felt that the making of collections 
and -remittances, the fulfilling of schedules and means· and 
meth@d ·of travel,~ the sending and receiving of letters and 
telegrams, ·the·· booking by talent of additipnal dates, means 
of publicity, travel and preparedness-for winter (items 34 and 
3 7) ,-- missed: dates: due to being snowbound,. the handling of 
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changes in assignments, etc.~ as a part of the ''conduct of his 
business., As such the plaintiff's activities in Utah were con· 
duct of business. 
The "Special Bulletins to Talent'' refer to («people on 
weekly salary," saying that "no talent would expect that we 
pay salary for that week" (a week missed due to fl.oo~s or 
snowblocked roads), and that rrwe wish u'e could pay you 
all we think you are worth ... " and that tcthree of four-people 
companies are not hit·ed for the same that single or double at-
tractions are hired. (Italics added-Exh. T). Similar state-
ments are found in Exhibits N, 0, and S. Mr. Green apparently 
considered the talent as his hired employees, to be paid weekly 
salaries out of his receipts. Consequently, plaintiff was an 
agent of the defendant-probably an employee. 
It seems clear from the evidence taken at the hearings 
(Exh. A-A and Record 47-50, inc.) and from the exhibits 
that Mr. Alward \Vas acting as agent and conducting business 
for Mr. Green during the days immediately preceding the re-
ceipt by him of the letter terminating his contract. Specifically, 
lvfr. Alward attempted to find his way through the snow-
blocked roads to fulfill his assignments in South Dakota, he 
received and sent mail and telegrams necessary to the business 
of Mr. Green, he made a remittance ( Exli. H) , he had tele-
phone conversations with Mr. Green concerning the business 
-all done while in the State of Utah. Mr. Alward notified 
Mr. Green by mail and by telephone of the difficulty he was 
encountering in getting through to the east over the snow-
blocked roads and of the improbability of success. Mr. Green 
expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Alward's efforts to .get 
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through and- held a heated telephone conversation with the 
plaintiff in which the latter was told, in substance, to make 
sure that he got out of town by Friday (Exh. A-A). Mr. 
Alward received a letter of termination (Exh. A) which was 
posted. before ccfriday" Y:hile still in Salt Lake City. The 
defendant failed to send further bi-weekly schedules as called 
for in the contract, making it impossible for the plaintiff to 
have performed had he could or would, and this lawsuit re-
sulted from the happenings. 
It can be seen that the controversy arose out of Mr. 
Alward's alleged n1isconduct of defendant's business while in 
Utah. The plaintiff's contention is that the defendant un-
justifiably terminated and cancelled their contract, while the 
defendant contends, or must contend, that the termination and 
cancell-ation was justified. This problem must be determined 
upon the merits of the matter. 
After defe!J.dant had failed to provide schedules as called 
for in their contract and had notified plaintiff that their con-
tract . was terminated suit was brought in Utah because of 
the obvious convenience to the plaintiff, who customarily resides 
in Utah when not lecturing. The witnesses to the plaintiff's 
efforts to find a way through the snowblock, the witnesses to 
the conditions of the roads and the witnesses as to weather 
conditions are in ·utah, and their testimony can much more 
conveniently be had in Utah than in any other state. 
The heart of the controversy necessarily boils down to a 
question of whether Mr. Alward's failure to make his arrange-
ments was justified by the road and weather conditions or 
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\vas ~1r. Green's failure to further ·perform under their con-
tract and his termination thereof justified by circumstances 
surrounding Mr. Alward's refusal or failure to tnake his as-
signments ? The answer is to be found in the testimony of 
Utah witnesses and the action should therefore properly be 
tried in Utah insofar as determining the case on its merits is 
concerned. 
A further point raised at the hearing in the lower court 
concerned itself "rith whether the legislature intended to ex-
clude suits by Utah agents against non-resident principals from 
the benefits of Rule 17 (e). Plaintiff submits that such an 
intent can not be read into the statute in absence of some ex-
press statement or qualification of the statute. Section 104-5-
11.10, if complied with, permits any lTtah . resident, whether 
agent, employee or otherwise, to _obtain personal service in 
this state upon a non-resident. Surely the legislature intended 
to extend the benefits of the law to all Utah residents, irre-
spective of whether or not they be agents or employees of the 
defendant. 
Plaintiff submits that the exhibits on file in this action, 
standing alone, present the complete picture as effectively as 
volumes of written brief in support of his contention that this 
situation comes within the purview of Rule 17 (e) . 
SUMMARY 
Inasmuch as the constitutionality of the statute was de-
cided affirmatively in the case of Wein v. Crockett, 195 Pac. 
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2d 222 -in 1948, Jhe s0le issue involved i~ whether or not the 
facts of ·this case come within the purview of Rule 17 (e) .. 
In recent years statutes similar to our Utah statute have 
become very numerous. As stated in 10 ALR 2d 200": 
tc ••• Today in most, if not all, states, jurisdiction 
of a non-resident defendant, corporate or otherwise, 
may be acquired by substituted service upon his agent 
or employee if the defendant is doing business within 
the forum state . . . " 
These statutes, though v;orded differently, are basically 
similar to our Utah statute. However, one of the most marked 
distinctions existing among the various acts is· that some, like 
Iowa, allow service to be had upon non-residents only when 
the age11t is doing business out of an office or agency, but 
other statutes as are found in Utah, New York, Mississippi 
and other states have been held constitutional even though 
the business done by the non-resident need not be conducted 
from any fixed office or agency. Mississippi recently held a 
similar statute constitutional in the case of Condon v. S. (1949), 
38 Southern 2d 752. 
It must be borne in mind that each statute differs in cer-
tain minor respects from those of other states and, consequently, 
the facts of each case must be analyzed with respect to their 
application to the · particular statute. This is the appellant 
has attempted to do throughout the preceding portion of this 
brief. 
Having heretofore argued the points that the defendant 
was doing business by means of agents and in one or more 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
places and that this lawsuit arose out of the conduct of business 
done in Utah it would be interesting to investigate the trend 
of recent cases. To this tin1e the cases on the subject of what 
constitutes- doing business are, as stated in 10 ALR 2d 200, 
Ct ••• extremely fe\v ... " 
In the case of lVIelt1in Pine & Co. 11. lHcConnell, 273 App. 
Div. 218, 76 NYS 2d 279, 10 ALR 2d 194, affd. 298 NY 27, 
80 NE 2d 13 7, the agents served in a breach of -contract action 
were manufacturer's agents for a co-partnership having its 
principal place of business and manufacturer in Ohio. The 
New York statute, similar to ours, reads in part as follows: 
"When any natural person or persons not residing 
in this state shall engage in business in this state, in 
any action against such person or persons arising out 
of such business, the summons may be served by leaving 
a copy thereof with the complaint with the person who, 
at the time of service, is in charge of any business in 
which the defendant or defendants are engaged within 
this state, . . . " 
The agents solicited orders as selling agents for the de-
fendant, one receiving a salary plus a commission and the 
other being on a strict commission basis, and both being 
" ... independent contractors to some extent." Orders so-
licited had to be accepted at the factory in Ohio before they 
became binding. The partnership did not maintain a bank 
account, account books, records or office space in New York 
state. The sa]es representatives maintained their own offices 
at their own expense and represented other firms as well as 
the defendant. Checks drawn to the agent's O"\Vn order were 
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deposited in .. a special account and_ the pro~~s remitted to 
the defendants after deduction of shipping .and other charges. 
Upon the foregoing set of facts the New York court held 
the defendants to be doing business within the meaning of 
· the statute and· that service upon the sales representatives con-
ferred jurisdiction of the pa-rtners. In handing down its de-
cision the court said: 
c c In cases of this sort it is the cumulative significance 
of all the activities conducted in this jurisdiction rather 
than the isolated effect of any single activity that is 
determinative on the question of doing business in 
the state . . . " 
The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the desision, 
said: 
CCDefendants' local activities amply satisfied the long-
recognized test of what constitutes engaging in business, 
as laid down in the decisions of this court . . . It is 
unnecessary at this time, to say \vhether and to what 
extent that test may be relaxed in reliance upon the 
constitutional principles recently announced by the 
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton (326 US 310) ." 
In the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
US 310, 66 C. Ct. 154 (1945) 161 ALR 1049, the United States 
Supretne Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, 
held that service of process upon traveling salesmen who merely 
solicited orders which were not binding until accepted by the 
home office in St. Louis subjected the corporation to the juris-
diction of the State of Washington for the purpose of recover-
ing contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund, 
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and that the corporation was doing business in and physically 
present in the state. Furthermore, such action did not violate 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In that action the defendant shoe company appeared 
specially on grounds almost identical to those raised by the 
defendant in this case, particularly specifying that it had no 
office in Washington and that its salesmen were on a commis-
sion basis only. In response to such argument Mr. Chief 
Justice Stone said: 
nApplying these standards, the activities carried on 
in behalf of appellant in the State of Washington 
were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic 
and continuous throughout the years in question. They 
resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in 
the course of which appellant received the benefits and 
protection of the laws of the state, including the right 
to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. 
The obligation v1hich is here sued upon arose out of 
those very activities. It is evident that these operations 
establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of 
the forum to make it reasonable and just according to 
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial 
justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations 
\vhich appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot 
say that the maintenance of the present suit in the 
State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue 
procedure." 
In the case of Wein v. Crockett, supra, the law upholding 
in personam jurisdiction of non-residents doing business within 
this state was amply and carefully discussed and therefore need 
not be cited in this brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff submits that, in view of the facts of this case, 
as proved by the evidence and in view of decided law on the 
subject, defendant's activities are of such nature that all of the 
requirements of Rule 17 (e) are fulfilled and that he should 
be required to answer the complaint filed against him in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK R. DECKER, 
GLEN E. FULLER, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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